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Abstract
We estimate a two-country open economy version of the New Keynesian DSGE model
for the U.S. and the Euro area, using Bayesian techniques that allow for both determinacy
and indeterminacy of the equilibrium. Our empirical analysis shows that the worldwide
equilibrium is indeterminate due to a passive monetary policy in the Euro area, even if U.S.
policy is aggressive enough. We demonstrate that the impulse responses under indeterminacy
exhibit dierent dynamics than those under determinacy and that sunspot shocks aect the
Euro economy to a substantial degree, while the transmission of sunspots to the U.S. is
limited.
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomic stability is a primary concern for central banks. In this respect, researchers have
emphasized the possibility that certain monetary policy rules lead to indeterminacy of rational
expectations equilibrium, which is considered an unfavorable outcome, since the economic system
might be unexpectedly volatile. It is well known that in the prototypical New Keynesian dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, indeterminacy can occur if the monetary authority
does not raise the interest rate aggressively enough in response to an increase in ination, which is
called the Taylor principle. In a two-country open economy setting, Bullard and Schaling (2009)
discuss from a theoretical perspective that the worldwide equilibrium can be indeterminate when
one country satises the Taylor principle and the other does not.1
The primary purpose of this paper is to empirically examine whether the worldwide equilib-
rium is determinate or not based on a two-country open economy version of the New Keynesian
DSGE model for the U.S. and the Euro area. Although the previous studies such as Clarida,
Gal, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) have shown that U.S. monetary
policy post-1982 is consistent with determinacy in a closed economy framework, the equilibrium
might be indeterminate in a two-country open economy framework if the monetary policy in the
Euro area is not aggressive enough. In the empirical literature on European monetary policy,
while Clarida, Gal, and Gertler (1998) and Gerdesmeier and Roa (2004) among others report
that the reaction functions for the Bundesbank or the European Central Bank (ECB) respond
to ination aggressively enough, Faust, Rogers, and Wright (2001) and Gerlach (2007) point
out that the ECB's policy might put a higher weight on the output gap than on ination. The
ndings in the latter studies imply the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy in our present
context, although they do not explicitly discuss it.
To investigate the possibility of worldwide indeterminacy, we estimate the model over a
parameter space in which the equilibrium can be both determinate and indeterminate, using
the system-based Bayesian methods developed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).2 The full-
1A number of papers have investigated conditions for determinacy in small open economy settings. For instance,
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999) report that determinacy conditions in a closed economy framework carry over to a
small open economy, whereas De Fiore and Liu (2005) point out the importance of trade openness in generating
a determinate equilibrium.
2While a growing number of papers have estimated open economy DSGE models using Bayesian techniques,
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information likelihood-based approach has advantages over single-equation GMM estimation in
that we can implicitly generate an optimal set of instruments for the coecients of the equations
and provide an overall measure of the time series t of the model. Based on this measure, we
can construct posterior weights for the determinacy and indeterminacy regions of the parameter
space. Our empirical analysis suggests that the equilibrium is indeterminate due to the passive
monetary policy in the Euro area. This nding casts doubt on the common practice that
calibrates a European monetary policy similar to that of the U.S. or estimates policy rules in
the parameter space leading only to determinacy.
Another contribution of this paper is to investigate the propagation of shocks and the dy-
namic behavior under indeterminacy in the two-country model. DSGE models under inde-
terminacy exhibit two remarkable features: First, the propagation of fundamental shocks is
ambiguous, since agents are unable to coordinate on a particular equilibrium among multiple
equilibria. Second, sunspot shocks, which are non-fundamental disturbances, aect the equilib-
rium dynamics. Taking into account these features, we demonstrate that impulse responses to
fundamental shocks under indeterminacy are in stark contrast to those under determinacy, and
that while sunspot shocks aect the Euro economy to a substantial degree, the transmission of
sunspots to the U.S. is limited.
Additionally, we examine whether sunspot shocks are helpful in explaining the exchange rate
dynamics. Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) estimate a richer two-country model, and conclude that
their model as well as those of other previous studies is still far from explaining the exchange rate
movements. Since the model under indeterminacy generally exhibits more persistent dynamics,
it might be a good candidate for explaining persistence in the observed dynamics. However, our
results are subject to the same diculties as the previous studies, even if we allow for sunspots,
which suggests that self-fullling expectations are not the main source of the exchange rate
dynamics.
The most closely related paper is Bullard and Singh (2008). They consider a multi-country
most of the studies estimate small open economy models. See Adolfson, Laseen, Linde, and Villani (2007),
Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), and Justiniano and Preston (2010) among others. On the other hand, empirical
studies of two-country settings are scarce. Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) is one of the rst attempts to estimate
a two-country model. More recently, Adjemian, Paries, Smets (2008) estimate a richer two-country model that
incorporates the wide range of nominal and real frictions. These papers consider only determinacy regions for
parameter estimation.
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version of Clarida, Gal, and Gertler's (2002) model and numerically characterize determinacy
conditions that depend on monetary policy parameters. They then estimate monetary policy
rules for the U.S., Germany (the Euro area in a recent period) and Japan using GMM, and point
out the possibility of worldwide indeterminacy and transmission of sunspots across borders even
when the U.S. monetary policy is consistent with determinacy. Our approach is methodologi-
cally dierent in that we apply the system-based Bayesian estimation techniques that help to
estimate DSGE models with cross-equation restrictions, coping well with misspecication and
identication problems. While our main ndings about worldwide indeterminacy are the same
as those of Bullard and Singh (2008), our empirical results with regard to the low degree of
sunspot transmission across countries contrast with their simulation results.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the two-country DSGE model
that is used for our analysis. In Section 3, we review a full set of rational expectations solutions,
which allows for both determinacy and indeterminacy, and discuss the sources of indeterminacy
in the two-country model. Section 4 explains the Bayesian estimation strategy. In Section
5, our benchmark estimation results are presented and we explore whether the data suggests
equilibrium indeterminacy and to what extent sunspot shocks aect the equilibrium dynamics in
the U.S. and the Euro area. Section 6 is to check the robustness of our ndings under alternative
dynamic structures and monetary policy rules. Section 7 is the conclusion.
2 The Model
The model is a two-country extension of the standard New Keynesian monetary DSGE model,
and is considered to be a two-country version of Gal and Monacelli (2005) or a simplied version
of Lubik and Schorfheide (2006). The world economy consists of the U.S. (the domestic or home
country) and the Euro area (the foreign country), which are assumed to be of the same size.3 In
each country, the representative household gains utility from aggregate consumption composed
of home and foreign goods, and trades state contingent assets in complete international asset
markets. Monopolistically competitive rms produce dierentiated goods, and are subject to
Calvo-type staggered price-setting. Monetary authorities adjust the nominal interest rates in
response to ination and output growth. While we assume symmetric consumer preferences, the
3Indeed, the two regions are roughly the same size and have a similar per capita income.
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two regions dier in price-setting, monetary policy and fundamental shocks. The assumptions
with regard to preferences, technology and complete nancial markets give us a highly tractable
framework for the open economy so that it can be comparable to the simplest New Keynesian
closed economy.
2.1 Households
The innitely lived household in the home country maximizes the following utility function:
E0
1X
t=0
t [logCt  Nt] ;
where  is a discount factor and  1 > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for
consumption. Nt denotes the labor supply. Ct is a composite consumption index dened by
Ct 
h
(1  ) 1 (CH;t)
 1
 + 
1
 (CF;t)
 1

i 
 1
;
where CH;t is consumption of domestic goods, and CF;t is imported goods from a foreign country.
0    1 represents the degree of openness, which is inversely related to home bias in the
preference.  > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
The maximization problem above is subject to the budget constraint:
PH;tCH;t + PF;tCF;t + Et [t;t+1Dt+1]  Dt +WtNt + Tt;
where PH;t is the price of domestic goods and PF;t is the price of imported goods in terms of
domestic currency. Dt+1 is the nominal payo from a portfolio of assets, t;t+1 is the stochastic
discount factor, Wt is the nominal wage, and Tt is lump-sum taxes of transfers.
The consumer price index (CPI) is dened as the minimum expenditure required to buy one
unit of the composite goods Ct, given the prices of home and foreign goods:
Pt 
h
(1  )P 1 H;t + P 1 F;t
i 1
1 
: (1)
Then, the optimal allocation of any given expenditure between domestic and imported goods
yields:
CH;t = (1  )

PH;t
Pt
 
Ct; (2)
and
CF;t = 

PF;t
Pt
 
Ct: (3)
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Accordingly, the rst order conditions for the households' maximization problem are derived
in aggregate terms:
1
Ct
= t (4)
1
t
=
Wt
Pt
; (5)
and
t;t+1 = 
t+1
t
Pt
Pt+1
; (6)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier interpreted as the marginal utility of income. Let Rt denote
the gross return on a nominal one-period discount bond. Then, from (6), we obtain the following
Euler equation:
R 1t = Et

t+1
t
Pt
Pt+1

; (7)
where R 1t = Ett;t+1 is the price of the discount bond.
2.2 Price Setting Firms and Market Clearing
In the home country, each rm, indexed by j, produces dierentiated goods YH;t (j) using the
following technology:
YH;t (j) = AW;tAtNt (j) ;
where At is a stationary and country-specic technology shock, and AW;t is a non-stationary
world-wide technology component that follows a random walk with drift:
lnAW;t = log  + lnAW;t 1 + ezt:
Here,  is the (gross) trend growth rate and ezt represents a shock to world-wide technology
growth.4
The monopolistically competitive rms are assumed to set their prices with probability 1 H ,
as in Calvo (1983). Then, H represents a degree of price stickiness. In resetting a new price in
period t, each rm j maximizes:
Et
1X
k=0
kHt;t+kYH;t+k (j)

PH;t(j)  PH;t+kMCH;t+k

;
4The model restricts that the steady-state growth rate in the home country is identical to that in the foreign
country. This restriction does not seem to be at odds with the data since the average growth rates in the U.S.
and the Euro area are not too dierent in our estimation period, at quarterly frequency 0.6 and 0.5 percent
respectively.
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subject to:5
YH;t+k (j) =

PH;t(j)
PH;t+k
 
YH;t+k;
where PH;t(j) is the price adjusted by the rm j at period t, MCH;t =
Wt
PH;tAW;tAt
denotes the
real marginal cost, YH;t is the aggregate output in the home country.
Then, PH;t(j) must satisfy the rst order condition:
1X
k=0
kHEt

t;t+kYH;t+k

PH;t   
  1PH;t+kMCH;t+k

= 0: (8)
where the j subscript is dropped since all rms resetting prices in any given period will choose
the same price. Under the present price-setting structure, the domestic price index is given by:
PH;t =
h
HP
1 
H;t 1 + (1  H)P
1 
H;t
i 1
1 
: (9)
2.3 Monetary Policy
As in Lubik and Schorfheide (2006), the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate Rt in
response to deviation of ination t = log(Pt=Pt 1) and output growth log(YH;t=YH;t 1) from
each steady state value. The monetary policy rule is of the following form:
log

Rt
R

= r log

Rt 1
R

+ (1  r)

  log
t


+  y log

YH;t=YH;t 1


+ "R;t; (10)
with 0  r < 1,   > 0 and  y > 0. "R;t  N(0; 2R) is a serially uncorrelated exogenous policy
shock that can be interpreted as an unsystematic component of the monetary policy.
2.4 The Foreign Economy and International Dependence
We assume that the foreign country is characterized by the same functional forms and household
preferences as the home country, but can dier in terms of price setting behavior and monetary
policy. The equations that describe the foreign economy are then obtained in a straightforward
way by substituting the relevant variables with subscript F and superscript  into the expressions
above.
5The demand curve that each rm faces is derived from the denition of aggregate demand as the com-
posite of individual goods and the corresponding prices in the framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977): YH;t =hR 1
0
YH;t(j)
 1
 dj
i 
 1
and PH;t =
hR 1
0
PH;t(j)
1 dj
i 1
1 
.
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The terms of trade and the real exchange rate in home currency are dened as:
qt =
PH;t
PF;t
: (11)
and
st =
etP

t
Pt
; (12)
where et is the nominal exchange rate (the price of the foreign currency in terms of the home
currency). The law of one price and the symmetry imply that the relevant variables in the
foreign currency are expressed as qt = q
 1
t and s

t = s
 1
t .
Given the international tradability of state contingent assets, the stochastic discount factors
in the two countries have to be equalized in equilibrium:
t;t+1 = 

t+1
t
Pt
Pt+1

= 

t+1
t
P t
P t+1
et
et+1

: (13)
Then, assuming complete international asset markets, the risk-sharing condition between house-
holds in the two countries is:
t = #

t s

t ; (14)
where # is a constant term determined by initial conditions regarding the ratio of the marginal
utilities.
Goods market clearing in each country requires that:
YH;t = CH;t + C

H;t +GH;t; (15)
and
Y F;t = C

F;t + CF;t +G

F;t; (16)
where government expenditures GH;t and G

F;t are exogenous and we call them goverment spend-
ing shocks.
2.5 Detrending and Linearization
Since the model economy described above contains a non-stationary world-wide technology shock
AW;t, we detrend the associated real variables by the level of AW;t to induce stationarity. The
detrended model then has a non-stochastic steady state. We proceed by log-linearizing the rst-
order conditions and market clearing conditions together with denitional relationships. All
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the variables below are expressed as log-deviation from their respective steady states such thatext = log xt   log x.
Detrending and log-linearizing the rst order conditions (4) and (7) for the home consumer
problem, we obtain the marginal utility of consumption and the Euler equation:
et =  ect;
and
 et =  Etet+1   ( eRt   Etet+1) + Etezt+1:
Recall that ezt =  eAW;t. CPI ination is derived from the denition (1):
et = eF;t + (1  )eH;t
The rms' optimal price setting (8) together with (9) can be approximated by the following
Phillips curve relationship: eH;t = EteH;t+1 + Hfmct;
with H =
(1 H)(1 H)
H
. Using the condition (5), the real marginal cost for domestic rm can
be written as: fmct =  et   eqt   eAt:
A linearized version of the monetary policy rule is:
eRt = R eRt 1 + (1  R) [ et +  y(eyH;t + ezt)] + "R;t; (17)
where "R;t  N(0; 2R).
Using equations (2) { (3) and the denitions of the terms of trade (11) and the real exchange
rate (12), the condition for home goods market clearing can be given by:
eyH;t = ect + egt   eqt +  (   1) est:
An analogous set of equations holds for the foreign country:
et =  ect ;
eF;t = EteF;t+1 + F fmct ;
with F =
(1 F )(1 F )
F
, fmct =  et   eqt   eAt ;
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et = eH;t + (1  )eF;t;
eRt = R eRt 1 + (1  R)  et +  y(eyF;t + ezt)+ "R;t; (18)
where "R;t  N(0; 2R), and
eyF;t = ect + egt   eqt    (   1) est:
Combining the denitions of the terms of trade (11) and the real exchange rate (12) with
that of CPI (1), we obtain a relationship between the real exchange rate and terms of trade:
est =   (1  ) eqt:
Terms of trade evolve according to:
eqt = eqt 1 + eH;t   eF;t;
eqt = eqt 1 + eF;t   eH;t;
with eqt =  eqt :
The denition of the real exchange rate also gives nominal exchange rate dynamics:
et = et   et + est   est 1 + "E;t (19)
where "E;t  N(0; 2E) is the exogenous PPP shock that is introduced to account for the empirical
invalidity of the PPP relationship. Note that in the present model, the PPP shocks are estimated
as a residual of the equation (19), so that the shocks are not transmitted to the other variables
except for the observed movements of the nominal exchange rate.
A linearized version of the international asset pricing equation for nominal bonds (13) implies
the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition:
eRt   eRt = Etet+1   Etet+1 + Etest+1   est; (20)
whereas the risk-sharing condition (14) is given by:
et = et   est:
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The exogenous shocks are assumed to follow the following autoregressive process:
ezt = zezt 1 + "z;t;eAt = A eAt 1 + "A;t;
egt = Gegt 1 + "G;t;eAt = A eAt 1 + "A;t;
egt = Gegt 1 + "G;t;
where 0  x < 1 and "x;t  N(0; 2x) for x 2 fz;A;G;A; Gg.
3 Sunspot Solution and Sources of Indeterminacy
A distinctive feature of our analysis is that the two-country model is analyzed over the parameter
space where the equilibrium can be indeterminate, and hence, sunspot shocks can aect the
equilibrium dynamics. In this section, a full set of sunspot solutions of the linear rational
expectations system is rst presented. Next, in our framework, we address the possibility that
indeterminacy occurs due to a passive monetary policy in one country in spite of the other
country responding aggressively enough to ination.
3.1 Sunspot Solution
In solving a rational expectations system, we follow the approach of Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003), which provides a full set of non-unique solutions in linear rational expectations models
by extending the solution algorithm developed by Sims (2002).6 In their approach, the log-
linearized system can be written in the following canonical form:
 0 ()xt =  1 ()xt 1 +	0 () "t +0 () t; (21)
where  0,  1, 	0 and 0 are the conformable matrices of coecients that depend on the struc-
tural parameters , xt is a stacked vector of endogenous variables and those with expectations at
t, and "t is a vector of fundamental shocks. t is a vector of endogenous forecast errors, dened
as:
t = bxt   Et 1bxt;
6Sims' solution method generalizes the technique in Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and characterizes one partic-
ular solution in the case of indeterminacy.
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where bxt is a subvector of xt that contains expectational variables. In the present model, bxt
consists of H;t, t, 

F;t, 

t , st, t and zt.
Assuming that  0 () is non-singular,
7 the conditions for determinacy depend on the number
of unstable eigenvalues in   10 ()  1 () and the number of endogenous forecast errors. According
to Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), the full set of sunspot solutions under indeterminacy is:
xt =   ()xt 1 +	

;fM "t +(;M) t; (22)
where fM and M are arbitrary matrices, and t is a vector of sunspot shocks, which are non-
fundamental stochastic disturbances. If the equilibrium is determinate, the solution (22) is
reduced to:
xt =  
D ()xt 1 +	D () "t: (23)
The solution (22) has two important features under indeterminacy. First, business cycle
uctuations are generated not only by fundamental shocks but also by sunspot shocks. Second,
the equilibrium representation cannot be unique due to the arbitrary matrices fM and M , i.e.,
the model has multiple solutions, and dierent solutions may exhibit dierent propagation of
shocks. Therefore, in order to apply the sunspot solution to an analysis of economic dynamics,
we need to specify fM andM and to select a particular equilibrium path from an innite number
of equilibria; otherwise, any path can be considered as the equilibrium solution. In this paper,
following Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), the arbitrary matrices are estimated using Bayesian
methods.
3.2 Sources of Indeterminacy
The model employed in this paper is an extension of the closed New Keynesian model to the two-
country open economy. It is well known that determinacy of the equilibrium in a prototypical
closed New Keynesian model depends on the monetary policy rules.8 In particular, when the
monetary policy follows a current ination targeting rule, the equilibrium is determinate if the
monetary authority raises the nominal interest rate more than one percent in response to a one
percent increase in the ination rate, which is called the Taylor principle. It is also known, in
the case of Taylor rule that responds to both ination and the output gap, that the coecient
7If  0 is singular, the canonical system can be transformed through a generalized Schur decomposition.
8See, for instance, Bullard and Mitra (2002) or Woodford (2003).
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on the output gap does not substantially aect the condition for determinacy under plausible
parameter settings.
For a two-country model as in Clarida, Gal, and Gertler (2002), which is a simple variant of
our model, Bullard and Schaling (2009) show that determinacy of the worldwide equilibrium is
attainable if both countries obey the Taylor principle in terms of domestic producer price ina-
tion; that is, if one country satises the Taylor principle and the other does not, the worldwide
equilibrium will be indeterminate. Bullard and Schaling (2009) also consider the CPI-based
targeting rules, as is the case with our model, and point out the possibility that the equilibrium
can be determinate even when one of the countries chooses a passive policy, depending on the
size of each country. However, if both countries are of equal size, determinacy is maintained by
both countries satisfying the Taylor principle.
In our present setting, we have conrmed by numerical calculation that the ndings in Bullard
and Schaling (2009) carry over to our model, and that the CPI-based Taylor principle for both
countries meets the condition for determinacy, since we presume an equal size for each country.
Also, while our model exploits the monetary policy rules that respond to output growth as well
as ination, as specied in (17) and (18), we have checked that the eect of the coecients on
output growth to the condition for determinacy is quite marginal.9 Therefore, in the empirical
analysis that follows, we focus on the policy parameters on ination as a source of indeterminacy.
4 Estimation Strategy
For our empirical investigation, the distributions of the structural parameters are estimated
using Bayesian techniques. One of the important features of our analysis is that the parameters
are estimated over the parameter space in which the equilibrium can be both determinate and
indeterminate. Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), we begin with a review of how the
inferences are made in such a parameter region. Next, we describe the data used for estimation
and explain the prior distributions of the parameters.
9In addition, we have found that the policy smoothing parameters do not aect the conditions for determinacy.
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4.1 Bayesian Estimation Methodology
First, consider the case in which the parameter space D is restricted so that the equilibrium
is determinate. Let yt be a vector of observables and Y
T = fy1; :::; yT g. The parameters of the
structural model are collected in vector . Then, the data and the model can be related in the
following state-space form:
yt = A+Bxt;
xt = C()xt 1 +D()"t;
The rst equation is the measurement equation, where the matrices A and B select and scale
the relevant model variables xt to link them with observed data yt. The second equation is the
state transition equation for xt which corresponds to the solution (23) for the linear rational
expectations model. Assuming that all the shocks are normally distributed and uncorrelated
over time, we obtain the likelihood function:
LD  jY T  = p  Y T j
=
TY
t=1
p
 
ytjY t 1; 

;
which can be evaluated using the Kalman lter based on the state-space form above.
Next, consider the parameter space I in which the model exhibits equilibrium indetermi-
nacy. In such a case, the law of motion for state variables is aected by sunspot shocks, and
the solution multiplicity problem arises due to the arbitrary matrices fM and M , as we can see
from the solution (22). Since there is no relative relationship between these two matrices,10 we
impose normalization such that M = 1 with the dimension of the sunspot shock vector being
unity, following Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). The resulting sunspot shock is considered to be
a reduced-form sunspot shock, as dened in Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), in the sense that
it contains beliefs associated with all the expectational variables. Then, the state transition
equation is modied as follows:
xt = F ()xt 1 +G(;fM)"t +H()t:
10fM and M can be related to the correlation between fundamental shocks and sunspot shocks. For details,
see Lubik and Schorfheide (2003).
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The corresponding likelihood function is:
LI

;fM jY T = TY
t=1
p

ytjY t 1; ;fM :
In the subsequent analysis, the parameters are estimated over the parameter space which al-
lows for both determinacy and indeterminacy. Hence, the overall likelihood function is evaluated
by:
L

;fM jY T =  2 D	LD  jY T +  2 I	LI ;fM jY T ;
where

 2 i	 for i 2 fD; Ig is the indicator function that is one if  2 i and zero otherwise.
According to Bayes' theorem with a prior distribution p

;fM, the posterior distribution of 
is expressed as:
p

;fM jY T = L

;fM jY T p;fM
p (Y T )
(24)
=
L

;fM jY T p;fMR L;fM jY T p;fM ddfM :
Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods are used to generate draws from the posterior distribution.11
Based on the posterior draws, we can make inferences about structural parameters, impulse
responses, and variance decompositions.
4.2 Data and Priors
The data set used for estimation is identical to that of Lubik and Schorfheide (2006), who
estimate a similar model to ours for the U.S. and the Euro area, so that we can compare the
estimation results in terms of factors other than the data. The model is tted to the data on
output growth, ination, the nominal interest rate series for the U.S. and the Euro area, and
the nominal exchange rate. All the data are at quarterly frequencies from 1983:I to 2002:IV.
For a detailed description of the data, see Lubik and Schorfheide (2006).
The prior distributions of the structural parameters are reported in Table 1. Most of the
priors are by and large in line with Lubik and Schorfheide (2006), who set them based on a pre-
sample analysis of the observations and relevant micro-econometric studies. The priors for the
11For our subsequent analysis, 250,000 draws are generated with a random-walk Metropolis Algorithm, and the
rst 25,000 draws are discarded.
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parameters that are specic to our analysis are set as follows. While Clarida, Gal, and Gertler
(2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) have shown that U.S. monetary policy satised the
Taylor principle during the sample period, whether the policy in the Euro area did is an open
question in our context. Thus, we allow the monetary policy coecient on ination for the Euro
area to take a wide range of values that leads to both determinacy and indeterminacy; that is,
  is distributed around 1.1 with a wide condence interval ranging from 0.3 to 1.8 so that the
fraction of the parameter space that leads to indeterminacy is about half. On the other hand, we
set relatively tight priors for the U.S. monetary policy. The standard deviation of the sunspot
shock  has the same distribution as that of the government spending shock for each country.
The priors for the components of the arbitrary matrix fM are normally distributed around zero,
based on the fact that most of the previous studies typically ignore the solution multiplicity
under indeterminacy by setting fM as zero.12 Since we have no references for these parameters,
we set wide condence intervals for them.
5 Estimation Results
In this section, posterior distributions of the structural parameters, impulse responses, and
variance decompositions are presented. Based on these estimates, we examine the possibility
of equilibrium indeterminacy and whether and to what extent sunspot shocks can aect the
equilibrium dynamics in the U.S and the Euro area.
5.1 Posterior Distribution of the Structural Parameters
The posterior distributions of the structural parameters are reported in the last two columns of
Table 1. The monetary policy coecients in the U.S. are almost the same as their corresponding
priors since we impose relatively tight priors on them. Our primary interest is whether the
monetary policy in the Euro area is aggressive enough to lead to equilibrium determinacy. The
estimation results show that the policy coecient on ination rate   is below unity and does
not satisfy the Taylor principle, implying the equilibrium indeterminacy. On the other hand, the
policy coecient on the output growth  y is higher than the prior. These results are consistent
with the ndings in Gerlach (2007), who estimates the monetary policy rule of the ECB with
12The equilibrium representation with fM = 0 is a particular solution that Sims (2002) characterizes under
indeterminacy.
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careful examination of its ocial statements and concludes that the ECB has adjusted the
nominal interest rate in response to real economic activity rather than ination. The estimated
policy smoothing parameter R indicates the gradual adjustment of the interest rate.
The posterior estimates of the import share  and the parameter  that relates to the
elasticity of labor supply are smaller than their priors. The mean value of the so-called Calvo
parameter H for the U.S. rms is almost the same as the prior mean, whereas 

F for the Euro
area is higher than the prior.
As for the arbitrary matrix fM that takes eect under indeterminacy, some of the components
are far dierent from zero, implying that the propagation of the fundamental shocks can be
altered compared with the determinacy case. The other parameters are in line with the priors,
and are consistent with the ndings in Lubik and Schorfheide (2006).
5.2 Determinacy vs. Indeterminacy
Our estimation procedure takes into account both the possibility of determinacy and indetermi-
nacy. According to the prior distributions, the prior probability of indeterminacy is 48 percent
as noted in Table 1. In what follows, we investigate the extent to which the data favors inde-
terminacy against determinacy by computing posterior probabilities for each parameter space.
The posterior probabilities for the determinacy and indeterminacy region of the parameter
space are computed from the following marginal data densities:
pi
 
Y T

=
Z 
 2 i	L;fM jY T p;fM ddfM;
for i 2 fD; Ig. Then, the posterior probability of indeterminacy is given by
I =
pI
 
Y T

pI (Y T ) + pD (Y T )
:
The resulting log-data densities13 are ln pD
 
Y T

=  802:74 and ln pI  Y T  =  795:06. Thus,
the posterior probability of indeterminacy is higher than that of determinacy. Therefore, the data
prefers equilibrium indeterminacy and suggests that sunspot shocks aect the macroeconomic
dynamics during the period.
The marginal data densities also illustrate an advantage of our estimation procedure that
allows for indeterminacy since they measure the overall t of the model under each parameter
13The log marginal data densities are approximated using the harmonic mean estimator proposed by Geweke
(1999).
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region. If we restricted the parameter space that leads to determinacy, the empirical performance
of the model would be substantially worse.
Our nding about indeterminacy due to the passive monetary policy against ination in
the Euro area is in contrast to the univariate GMM estimates reported in the previous studies
such as Clarida, Gal, and Gertler (1998) and Gerdesmeier and Roa (2004). However, our
full-information system-based estimators are more ecient and are less subject to identication
problems than instrumental variable estimators based on single equations, as discussed in Ruge-
Murcia (2007). Our approach involves the solution for the rational expectations system with
cross-equation restrictions both under determinacy and indeterminacy, so that we can estimate
the parameters based on the measure of the overall time series t, assessing the importance
of the sunspot shocks and the propagation of the fundamental shocks. On the other hand,
a weakness of our approach is that the results might be sensitive to model misspecication.
Concerning this issue, we investigate the robustness of our estimation results under alternative
model specications in Section 6.
5.3 Impulse Responses
The dynamic property of the estimated model is examined by impulse response analysis. Figure
1 and 2 depict the posterior means (solid lines) and 90-percent posterior probability intervals
(dashed lines) for impulse responses of output growth, ination, the nominal interest rate, in
each country, and depreciation of the nominal exchange rate to the one-standard deviation
shocks: home and foreign policy, home and foreign technology, home and foreign government
spending, world-wide technology, and sunspot shocks.14 Since the model is based on a two-
country version of a New Keynesian monetary DSGE framework, most of the impulse responses
are as expected. However, some of the responses may be non-standard since we allow for
equilibrium indeterminacy. Under indeterminacy, as demonstrated in Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003, 2004), both the dierence in structural parameters and the existence of the arbitrary
matrix fM can signicantly alter the propagation of fundamental shocks.
The positive monetary policy shock in the U.S. has contractionary eects on domestic output
14The responses of the PPP shock are excluded from the gures since the PPP shock is treated as a residual of
the equation (19) and only aects the movement of the nominal exchange rate depreciation, as noted in Section
2.
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and ination. These negative impacts are transmitted to the Euro area. As is consistent with
the nominal exchange rate dynamics and the UIP condition, the U.S. currency is appreciated in
the rst period and depreciated in the next period. Judging from the responses, the dynamic
behavior in the U.S. is similar to the one under determinacy that is demonstrated in Lubik and
Schorfheide (2006). On the other hand, the monetary policy shock in the Euro area generates
dramatically dierent dynamics. A contractionary monetary policy is supposed to lower output
and have a negative impact on ination. Since the monetary policy in the Euro area does
not respond more than one-to-one to ination, the real interest rate remains positive, which
furthermore lowers output and hence ination. However, such a spiral trajectory is explosive
and must be eliminated for the equilibrium to be stationary. Therefore, to ensure stationarity,
ination must be positive to some extent so that the real interest rate eventually leads output
toward its steady state. As a result, the positive ination in the Euro area is transmitted to
U.S. ination.
The U.S. technology shock has a negative eect on marginal cost and hence on ination.
Responding to negative ination, the monetary authority lowers the interest rate, which results
in depreciating the dollar. U.S. output is boosted because of high productivity, the low interest
rate, and improvement of the terms of trade. Transmission from the U.S. to the Euro area is
negative, since production shifts to the country with the higher productivity. The eects of the
Euro technology shock are quite marginal because of high price stickiness, and the direction of
the impulse responses are ambiguous due to the uncertainty of the arbitrary component fMA .
The government spending shock in the U.S. increases domestic output, but the crowding-out
eect on private consumption goods leads to a fall in marginal costs and domestic ination.
Resulting changes in the relative prices lead to appreciation in the dollar. On the other hand,
symmetric eects are not observed in the case of the government shock in the Euro area. This
is because the posterior estimate of fMG takes high value, implying that the eects of the
associated shock can be substantially dierent from those under determinacy. The larger drop
in ination lowers the nominal interest rate in the Euro area and depreciates the dollar, which
in turn give rise to a positive eect on U.S. ination.
The world technology shock has expansionary eects on output and lowers ination for both
the U.S. and the Euro area. Dierent degrees of price stickiness and monetary policy reactions
generate the dierential in ination and the interest rate, which results in the U.S. dollar being
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depreciated.
The sunspot shock is specic to our analysis. The estimated sunspot shock has substantial
negative impacts on the Euro variables. In the U.S., output decreases, but ination rises due to
the depreciation of the dollar. Since the sunspot shock is specied as a reduced-form sunspot,
as mentioned in Section 4.1, the dynamics is considered to be driven by beliefs for all the
expectational variables. However, judging from the impulse responses, the dominant source
of sunspots seems to be a belief in the future demand for domestic consumption goods in
the Euro area. While the government spending shock crowds out private consumption and
leads to negative comovement between output and ination in the Euro area, a belief shock to
domestic consumption can generate positive comovement between the two, as is consistent with
the responses. The same reasoning applies to positive comovement between output in the U.S.
and that in the Euro area.
Such self-fullling prophecies can be equilibrium when the monetary policy is passive in
the Euro area. Suppose that the agents change their expectations and come to believe that
domestic consumption will decrease. Given rms' price setting behavior, such expectations have
a negative eect on ination. If the monetary authority lowers the nominal interest rate enough
to lower the real interest rate, actual consumption increases and hence the initial expectations
turn out to be invalid. With a passive monetary policy, however, the real interest rate rises.
Then, actual consumption decreases and validates the initial expectations.
5.4 Variance Decompositions
In order to evaluate the relative importance of the individual shocks, we decompose the endoge-
nous volatilities based on the posterior distributions of the parameters. Table 2 reports variance
decompositions of output, ination, the nominal interest rate in each country and the nominal
exchange rate into the disturbances in the model.
For the U.S., output uctuations are mainly driven by U.S. technology shocks and domestic
government spending shocks, while volatilities of ination and the interest rate are explained
for the most part by U.S. technology shocks. The eects of the disturbances in the Euro area
on the U.S. variables are marginal.
For the Euro area, output movements are largely explained by domestic government spending
shocks and sunspot shocks. Changes in ination and the interest rate are mainly attributed to
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domestic policy and government shocks. A remarkable nding here is that almost half of the
output uctuation in the Euro area is driven by sunspot shocks. This nding is consistent with
our interpretation that the main source of sunspots is a belief shock to domestic consumption
goods. We also note that the eect of sunspot shocks on ination is non-negligible. These results
suggest that sunspots cause the Euro economy to be unexpectedly volatile due to the monetary
policy that leads to indeterminacy.
One of our primary interests is whether the sunspots ascribed to the monetary policy in the
Euro area aect the volatilities of U.S variables. Our results show that the eect of sunspot
shocks on the U.S. is negligible, implying that the main source of the sunspots is self-fullling
prophecies with respect to Euro variables, and that the transmission of sunspots to the U.S. is
limited. This nding stands in contrast to the result in Bullard and Singh (2008). They simulate
sunspot uctuations in a three-country version of Clarida, Gal, and Gertler's (2002) model
that consists of U.S., Germany (the Euro area in a recent period) and Japan under plausible
calibrations, and report that sunspots that originate in the country with a passive monetary
policy are transmitted to a substantial degree to the country with an aggressive policy. The
dierence between our results and theirs can be explained by the dierence in the parameters;
that is, our estimates for the degree of openness  and the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods  are both lower than the calibrated values in Bullard and Singh
(2008).15 As discussed in the previous subsection, the dominant source of the sunspots in our
estimated model is considered to be a belief in demand for domestic consumption goods in the
Euro area. Such a belief change induces changes in the relative prices, the terms of trade and the
real exchange rate. However, the propagation of these changes to the U.S. through international
trade should be weak when  and  are small. Another possible explanation is the dierence
in the way the sunspot variables are introduced. While Bullard and Singh (2008) assume that
the sunspot shock originates with respect to ination in countries with a passive monetary
policy, we employ a reduced-form sunspot shock so that sunspot uctuations are considered to
be driven by beliefs in all the expectational variables. Thus, in our estimates, various beliefs
in dierent directions might alleviate the total endogenous volatilities in the U.S. Furthermore,
Bullard and Singh (2008) show the extent of transmission of sunspot shocks across borders with
15The composite consumption index in Bullard and Singh (2008) is dened by the Cobb-Douglas aggregator,
which corresponds to  = 1 in our CES aggregator.
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no fundamental shocks. If they introduced various fundamental shocks as in our approach, the
relative importance of sunspots might be small.
In the present model, following Lubik and Schorfheide (2006), a PPP shock is added in the
form of an error term to the equation (19) that denes the nominal depreciation rate. The
PPP shock provides a measure of the extent to which the exchange rate data is explained by
specic features of the model. Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) conclude that their model as well
as those in other previous studies has diculty explaining the exchange rate dynamics. In our
approach, we can investigate whether sunspot shocks are helpful in explaining it. Our results
show that sunspots explain only 1{2 percent of the exchange rate volatility. Therefore, the
model is still very far from providing an explanation for exchange rate movements even if we
allow for sunspots under indeterminacy.
6 Robustness Analysis
Our empirical results have shown that the two-country economy exhibits indeterminacy of equi-
librium. In this section, we investigate the robustness of our ndings to alternative dynamic
structures that are relevant to identication issues discussed in Beyer and Farmer (2007). Also,
we consider another specication for monetary policy rules and examine whether or not our
ndings regarding indeterminacy are altered.
6.1 Alternative Dynamic Structures
Our experiment suggests that the data favors indeterminacy of the equilibrium ascribed to mon-
etary policy in the Euro area. Beyer and Farmer (2007), however, point out that determinacy
and indeterminacy can be observationally equivalent depending on lag structures of a model.
They show that an indeterminate model possibly exhibits the same law of motion as a deter-
minate one with additional lags, and argue that a model with simple dynamic structure could
lead to a false nding of indeterminacy. In response to their critique, Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007) address the fact that Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) have checked the robustness using a
model with additional lag structures, which does not alter their ndings about indeterminacy.
In this section, we conduct the same exercise as Lubik and Schorfheide (2004); that is, we incor-
porate consumption habit formation and backward-looking price setting into the baseline model
to ensure that our results are robust to alternative dynamic structures.
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First, we introduce internal habit formation as specied in Lubik and Schorfheide (2006).
Ct in the period utility function for the home country is replaced with the following eective
consumption under habit formation:
Ct = Ct   hCt 1;
where 0  h  1 is the habit persistence parameter. Then, the loglinearized version of the rst
order condition with respect to consumption is modied as:
 et = 1
1  h
eCt   h
1  h

Et eCt+1 + Etezt+1 ;
with
(1  h) eCt = ect   hect 1 + hezt:
Similarly, the equation for the foreign country is:
 ft = 1
1  h
fCt   h
1  h

EtfCt+1 + Etezt+1 ;
with
(1  h)fCt = ect   hect 1 + hezt:
Next, the equations for price-setting behavior are replaced with the hybrid New Keynesian
Phillips curves proposed by Gal and Gertler (1999). Let ! and ! denote, respectively, a fraction
of the domestic and foreign rms that set their prices using a simple rule of thumb based on the
previous aggregate prices. Then, the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve for domestic rms is
of the following form:
eH;t = 1
1 + !
h
!eH;t 1 + EteH;t+1 + H  et   eqt   eAti ;
and that for foreign rms is:
eF;t = 11 + ! h!eF;t 1 + EteF;t+1 + F  et   eqt   eAti :
With these equations, we re-estimate the model and compare the marginal data densities under
determinacy and indeterminacy regions. The prior for h is distributed according to a Beta
distribution with mean 0.3 and standard deviation 0.1, as is set in Lubik and Schorfheide (2006).
The prior for ! has a Beta distribution with mean 0.25 and standard deviation 0.05, which is in
line with the GMM estimates for U.S. data reported in Gal and Gertler (1999). The other priors
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are the same as the baseline case. According to the posterior distributions reported in Table
3, h is centered around 0.72, which suggests high persistency in consumption. The posterior
estimates for ! and ! are distributed around 0.22 and 0.23, which are almost the same as their
priors. The components in the arbitrary matrix fM are remarkably dierent from the baseline
estimates, implying that the alternative specication of the model can alter the propagation
of the fundamental shocks. The other parameters are by and large in line with our baseline
estimates.
The primary issue here is whether the inclusion of the additional lags in the model can
change our result suggesting indeterminacy. Based on the posterior estimates, the marginal
data densities for the determinacy and indeterminacy region are ln pD
 
Y T

=  793:99 and
ln pI
 
Y T

=  772:93, respectively. Therefore, the posterior probabilities imply that the data
still favors indeterminacy, and our ndings about indeterminacy are not overturned.
6.2 Alternative Monetary Policy Rules
In our baseline estimation, we have considered monetary policies that react to current variables
as specied in (17) and (18) to maintain comparability to the analysis of Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004). On the other hand, Clarida, Gal, and Gertler (1998, 2000) and Bullard and Singh
(2008) among others have estimated the monetary policy rules that respond to expected values
of ination and output. We now examine the robustness of our ndings by replacing the baseline
policy specication with the forward-looking policy rules.
We consider the following monetary policies reacting to expected ination and expected
output growth between periods t and t+ 1:
eRt = R eRt 1 + (1  R) [ Etet+1 +  y(EteyH;t+1 +Etezt+1)] + "R;t;
and eRt = R eRt 1 + (1  R)  Etet+1 +  y(EteyF;t+1 + Etezt+1)+ "R;t:
In general, alternative monetary policy rules can change the conditions for determinacy in New
Keynesian monetary DSGE models. However, Bullard and Mitra (2002) show that, in a closed
economy model with the forward-looking policy targeting expected ination and expected out-
put, the Taylor principle still applies unless the coecients on these variables are too large.
Bullard and Singh (2008) also characterize similar conditions in their open economy frame-
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work. In our present model, we have conrmed that the modication above gives the same prior
probability of indeterminacy, 48 percent, as in the baseline specication.
The last two columns in Table 3 report the posterior distributions of the parameters based
on the same priors as the baseline. In contrast to our baseline estimates, the policy coecient
on the expected output growth  y is relatively low. The other parameters are in line with the
baseline estimates.
In the same way as the previous subsection, we compute the marginal data densities for
the determinacy and indeterminacy regions, which are ln pD
 
Y T

=  859:86 and ln pI  Y T  =
 839:19, respectively. Therefore, the data still suggests indeterminacy under the forward-looking
policy rules. Also, we can see that the data densities here are both lower than those in the
baseline estimates reported in Section 5.2. The last nding empirically validates our baseline
specication and estimates presented in the previous sections.
7 Conclusion
We have estimated the two-country monetary DSGE model for the U.S. and the Euro area
over the parameter space where the equilibrium can be both determinate and indeterminate
using Bayesian methods. Our estimation results show that the data favors indeterminacy due
to passive monetary policy in the Euro area. We have demonstrated that the estimated impulse
responses are dierent from those under determinacy. While sunspot shocks substantially aect
the endogenous volatilities in the Euro area, the sunspot eects transmitted to the U.S. are
negligible. These ndings are novel in the estimated open-economy DSGE literature, since the
previous studies consider the parameter space that leads only to determinacy.
While the full-information likelihood-based approach employed in this paper delivers more
ecient estimates than univariate GMM estimates, one drawback is that this approach is poten-
tially sensitive to model misspecication. Although we have conducted a robustness analysis for
the model with the additional lag structures and the alternative monetary policy rules, a variety
of other specications could be considered. Incorporating other types of frictions and policy
rules might lead to distinct conditions for determinacy, and hence, might give rise to dierent
results.
In this paper, we assume that the monetary policy regime in each country is constant over
time. However, Davig and Leeper (2007, 2010) and Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2009a, 2009b,
25
2010) argue that the conditions for determinacy in a standard New Keynesian model can be
altered if the possibility of regime switching between passive and aggressive monetary policy
is taken into account. Also, Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2009) show that the expectation eect
of monetary policy regime switching has important implications for dynamics of output and
ination. Considering these possibilities in an open economy setting is left for future research.
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Table 1: Prior and Posterior Distributions
Prior distributions
Name Range Density Mean 90% interval
  <+ Gamma 1.50 [ 1.38, 1.62]
 y <+ Gamma 0.50 [ 0.34, 0.66]
  <+ Gamma 1.10 [ 0.32, 1.84]
 y <+ Gamma 0.50 [ 0.07, 0.93]
 [0; 1) Beta 0.12 [ 0.08, 0.16]
 <+ Gamma 1.00 [ 0.22, 1.71]
H [0; 1) Beta 0.50 [ 0.37, 0.62]
F [0; 1) Beta 0.75 [ 0.63, 0.87]
A [0; 1) Beta 0.80 [ 0.65, 0.96]
R [0; 1) Beta 0.50 [ 0.17, 0.83]
G [0; 1) Beta 0.80 [ 0.65, 0.96]
A [0; 1) Beta 0.60 [ 0.28, 0.93]
R [0; 1) Beta 0.50 [ 0.17, 0.83]
G [0; 1) Beta 0.80 [ 0.65, 0.96]
z [0; 1) Beta 0.66 [ 0.42, 0.91]
400 logR <+ Gamma 0.85 [ 0.53, 1.17]
100 log  < Normal 0.40 [ 0.06, 0.72]
400 <+ Gamma 3.00 [ 1.39, 4.55]
A <+ Inverse Gamma 1.25 [ 0.53, 1.98]
G <+ Inverse Gamma 1.25 [ 0.53, 1.98]
R <+ Inverse Gamma 0.50 [ 0.21, 0.79]
A <+ Inverse Gamma 0.50 [ 0.22, 0.80]
G <+ Inverse Gamma 1.25 [ 0.53, 1.98]
R <+ Inverse Gamma 0.25 [ 0.11, 0.40]
z <+ Inverse Gamma 0.63 [ 0.27, 0.99]
E <+ Inverse Gamma 4.39 [ 1.82, 6.90]
 <+ Inverse Gamma 1.25 [ 0.53, 1.98]
MA < Normal 0.00 [-2.47, 2.47]
MG < Normal 0.00 [-2.47, 2.47]
MR < Normal 0.00 [-2.47, 2.47]
MA < Normal 0.00 [-2.47, 2.47]
MG < Normal 0.00 [-2.47, 2.47]
MR < Normal 0.00 [-2.47, 2.47]
Mz < Normal 0.00 [-2.47, 2.47]
Posterior distributions
Mean 90% interval
1.46 [ 1.32, 1.59]
0.62 [ 0.47, 0.76]
0.56 [ 0.28, 0.85]
0.85 [ 0.20, 1.50]
0.11 [ 0.07, 0.14]
0.29 [ 0.08, 0.50]
0.47 [ 0.38, 0.56]
0.90 [ 0.87, 0.94]
0.81 [ 0.73, 0.90]
0.62 [ 0.56, 0.69]
0.88 [ 0.82, 0.94]
0.61 [ 0.29, 0.94]
0.94 [ 0.92, 0.97]
0.76 [ 0.66, 0.84]
0.68 [ 0.49, 0.87]
0.85 [ 0.59, 1.10]
0.39 [ 0.24, 0.54]
2.96 [ 2.38, 3.56]
1.04 [ 0.77, 1.32]
0.61 [ 0.48, 0.74]
0.23 [ 0.19, 0.26]
0.38 [ 0.21, 0.54]
1.37 [ 1.06, 1.68]
0.13 [ 0.11, 0.14]
0.26 [ 0.18, 0.36]
4.23 [ 3.72, 4.77]
0.44 [ 0.38, 0.51]
0.51 [ 0.32, 0.70]
-0.11 [-0.38, 0.16]
-0.57 [-1.12, 0.00]
-0.08 [-0.62, 0.47]
0.84 [ 0.74, 0.95]
0.14 [-0.91, 1.11]
0.66 [-0.03, 1.30]
Notes: According to the prior distributions, the fraction of the parameter space which leads
to indeterminacy is 48 percent. The posterior distributions are obtained using the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm.
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Table 2: Variance Decompositions
Shock Mean 90% interval
US output
Policy 7.40 [ 3.59, 10.84]
Policy* 0.06 [ 0.00, 0.15]
Technology 34.25 [25.50, 42.24]
Technology* 0.06 [ 0.00, 0.17]
Government 34.88 [23.69, 47.07]
Government* 5.30 [ 1.80, 8.90]
World Technology 17.21 [ 9.68, 23.88]
PPP 0.00 [ 0.00, 0.00]
Sunspot 0.84 [ 0.19, 1.55]
US ination
Policy 28.97 [19.81, 38.75]
Policy* 0.08 [ 0.00, 0.21]
Technology 53.04 [40.37, 64.39]
Technology* 0.06 [ 0.00, 0.17]
Government 6.81 [ 2.38, 10.89]
Government* 6.24 [ 3.25, 9.29]
World Technology 3.86 [ 0.68, 7.85]
PPP 0.00 [ 0.00, 0.00]
Sunspot 0.93 [ 0.32, 1.51]
US interest rate
Policy 3.46 [ 1.56, 5.18]
Policy* 0.05 [ 0.00, 0.11]
Technology 40.84 [21.90, 59.74]
Technology* 0.01 [ 0.00, 0.03]
Government 24.26 [ 3.16, 45.46]
Government* 0.93 [ 0.00, 1.79]
World Technology 30.31 [ 4.87, 57.47]
PPP 0.00 [ 0.00, 0.00]
Sunspot 0.14 [ 0.00, 0.28]
Exchange rate
Policy 0.76 [ 0.21, 1.32]
Policy* 2.19 [ 0.63, 3.53]
Technology 1.06 [ 0.24, 1.80]
Technology* 0.11 [ 0.00, 0.30]
Government 0.29 [ 0.04, 0.61]
Government* 10.92 [ 5.68, 15.84]
World Technology 0.67 [ 0.02, 1.21]
PPP 82.33 [76.66, 89.15]
Sunspot 1.67 [ 1.02, 2.31]
Shock Mean 90% interval
Euro output
Policy 2.22 [ 0.01, 5.48]
Policy* 3.17 [ 0.05, 7.38]
Technology 3.29 [ 0.01, 8.53]
Technology* 3.11 [ 0.00, 8.37]
Government 2.23 [ 0.00, 5.99]
Government* 24.41 [ 9.94, 37.96]
World Technology 13.98 [ 3.47, 24.66]
PPP 0.00 [ 0.00, 0.00]
Sunspot 47.59 [32.42, 64.15]
Euro ination
Policy 0.32 [ 0.01, 0.77]
Policy* 45.05 [25.32, 63.52]
Technology 2.27 [ 0.11, 4.71]
Technology* 0.47 [ 0.00, 1.23]
Government 0.36 [ 0.00, 0.91]
Government* 39.40 [24.36, 54.37]
World Technology 4.85 [ 0.44, 8.77]
PPP 0.00 [ 0.00, 0.00]
Sunspot 7.28 [ 2.72, 11.65]
Euro interest rate
Policy 0.10 [ 0.00, 0.30]
Policy* 79.56 [60.35, 99.17]
Technology 0.42 [ 0.00, 1.10]
Technology* 0.16 [ 0.00, 0.47]
Government 0.12 [ 0.00, 0.31]
Government* 12.94 [ 0.52, 25.63]
World Technology 4.06 [ 0.00, 11.88]
PPP 0.00 [ 0.00, 0.00]
Sunspot 2.64 [ 0.10, 5.16]
Notes: Forecast error variance decompositions of seven variables at the innite horizon. The
relative contribution of each shock is shown in percent. `*' indicates the shocks to the Euro area.
31
Table 3: Posterior Distributions under Additional Lag Structure and Alternative Policy Rules
Baseline
Name Mean 90% interval
h
!
!
  1.46 [ 1.32, 1.59]
 y 0.62 [ 0.47, 0.76]
  0.56 [ 0.28, 0.85]
 y 0.85 [ 0.20, 1.50]
 0.11 [ 0.07, 0.14]
 0.29 [ 0.08, 0.50]
H 0.47 [ 0.38, 0.56]
F 0.90 [ 0.87, 0.94]
A 0.81 [ 0.73, 0.90]
G 0.62 [ 0.56, 0.69]
R 0.88 [ 0.82, 0.94]
A 0.61 [ 0.29, 0.94]
G 0.94 [ 0.92, 0.97]
R 0.76 [ 0.66, 0.84]
z 0.68 [ 0.49, 0.87]
400 logR 0.85 [ 0.59, 1.10]
100 log  0.39 [ 0.24, 0.54]
400 2.96 [ 2.38, 3.56]
A 1.04 [ 0.77, 1.32]
G 0.61 [ 0.48, 0.74]
R 0.23 [ 0.19, 0.26]
A 0.38 [ 0.21, 0.54]
G 1.37 [ 1.06, 1.68]
R 0.13 [ 0.11, 0.14]
z 0.26 [ 0.18, 0.36]
E 4.23 [ 3.72, 4.77]
 0.44 [ 0.38, 0.51]
MA 0.51 [ 0.32, 0.70]
MG -0.11 [-0.38, 0.16]
MR -0.57 [-1.12, 0.00]
MA -0.08 [-0.62, 0.47]
MG 0.84 [ 0.74, 0.95]
MR 0.14 [-0.91, 1.11]
Mz 0.66 [-0.03, 1.30]
Additional lags
Mean 90% interval
0.72 [ 0.63, 0.81]
0.22 [ 0.15, 0.29]
0.23 [ 0.16, 0.30]
1.54 [ 1.42, 1.66]
0.47 [ 0.35, 0.60]
0.58 [ 0.30, 0.86]
0.70 [ 0.18, 1.16]
0.12 [ 0.09, 0.15]
0.28 [ 0.10, 0.45]
0.44 [ 0.35, 0.53]
0.91 [ 0.88, 0.95]
0.85 [ 0.79, 0.91]
0.71 [ 0.66, 0.76]
0.90 [ 0.85, 0.96]
0.62 [ 0.31, 0.93]
0.93 [ 0.90, 0.96]
0.90 [ 0.82, 0.98]
0.62 [ 0.45, 0.81]
0.85 [ 0.55, 1.10]
0.42 [ 0.30, 0.55]
3.20 [ 2.54, 3.82]
1.21 [ 0.93, 1.48]
0.51 [ 0.43, 0.60]
0.19 [ 0.16, 0.22]
0.49 [ 0.22, 0.75]
0.53 [ 0.44, 0.62]
0.13 [ 0.11, 0.14]
0.34 [ 0.21, 0.45]
4.24 [ 3.69, 4.78]
1.07 [ 0.72, 1.42]
-0.82 [-1.17, -0.44]
-0.74 [-1.47, -0.03]
-1.00 [-2.39, 0.37]
0.25 [-1.79, 2.37]
-1.30 [-2.02, -0.52]
-2.05 [-3.88, -0.37]
0.86 [-0.99, 2.64]
Alternative policies
Mean 90% interval
1.53 [ 1.41, 1.64]
0.39 [ 0.28, 0.51]
0.51 [ 0.24, 0.76]
0.35 [ 0.05, 0.64]
0.09 [ 0.06, 0.12]
0.37 [ 0.08, 0.64]
0.54 [ 0.46, 0.63]
0.89 [ 0.85, 0.93]
0.81 [ 0.76, 0.86]
0.59 [ 0.50, 0.68]
0.93 [ 0.88, 0.97]
0.62 [ 0.31, 0.96]
0.92 [ 0.88, 0.95]
0.74 [ 0.65, 0.83]
0.27 [ 0.11, 0.42]
0.96 [ 0.64, 1.27]
0.43 [ 0.34, 0.51]
2.75 [ 2.02, 3.48]
0.88 [ 0.65, 1.12]
0.65 [ 0.52, 0.78]
0.19 [ 0.16, 0.22]
0.49 [ 0.19, 0.81]
1.42 [ 1.07, 1.75]
0.13 [ 0.11, 0.14]
0.40 [ 0.27, 0.52]
4.25 [ 3.71, 4.77]
0.57 [ 0.47, 0.68]
0.38 [ 0.13, 0.61]
0.01 [-0.32, 0.35]
-0.45 [-1.59, 0.69]
-0.05 [-0.79, 0.73]
0.52 [ 0.37, 0.67]
-0.45 [-1.54, 0.68]
1.11 [ 0.49, 1.76]
Note: The posterior distributions are obtained using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
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